Crash Report · Full Crash Test
Taskly (illustrative)
Top findings
Dummy B can read every one of Dummy A's tasks
Signed in as Dummy B, we asked the database for tasks that belong to Dummy A, and it handed over all 14. In production, every customer could read every other customer's tasks.
T+00.000s Dummy A signs in ✓
T+00.418s Dummy A POST /rest/v1/tasks → 201
T+01.902s Dummy B signs in ✓
T+02.117s Dummy B GET /rest/v1/tasks?user_id=eq.:dummyA → 200 · 14 rows
T+02.117s ███ IMPACT ███ Dummy B read Dummy A's tasks TOTALED
Evidence kept: request shape, status, row count and content hashes. Task contents are never stored.
Turn on Row Level Security for the tasks table. Add policies so that a signed-in user can only select, insert, update and delete rows where user_id equals their own auth.uid(). Logged-out visitors should not be able to read anything from this table. Don't change any other tables. When you're done, list every policy on tasks in plain English so I can review it.
Dummy B gave itself the Pro plan
Users may edit their own row in profiles, and that row also holds is_pro. One request unlocked every paid feature without paying.
T+03.004s Dummy B PATCH /rest/v1/profiles?id=eq.:self → 204
T+03.210s Dummy B opens /pro/board → 200
T+03.210s ███ IMPACT ███ Dummy B unlocked Pro without paying CRASH
Users can currently edit their own row in profiles, including is_pro. Move is_pro into a separate user_roles table that regular users can read for themselves but cannot insert, update or delete. Only server-side code (an Edge Function, for example after a verified Stripe payment) may change it. Update the app to read the plan from the new table. Then confirm that a regular user can still edit their name and avatar, and nothing else.
Anyone can list and download uploaded files
The attachments storage bucket is public. The Stranger, with no account, listed 37 files, including invoices users uploaded.
T+00.000s Anonymous loads the app ✓
T+00.640s Anonymous POST /storage/v1/object/list/attachments → 200 · 37 files
T+00.640s ███ IMPACT ███ Anonymous can list every uploaded file CRASH
Make the attachments storage bucket private. Users should only be able to upload to and download from their own folder. Show files to their owner using signed URLs that expire after 10 minutes. Don't change the avatars bucket, which is meant to stay public.
The 2 Dents and 3 Scratches follow in the full report, each with its own replay and repair prompt.
What we checked
| Check | Who ran it | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Secrets in your public code | The Stranger | Pass |
| Tables anyone can read | The Stranger | Pass |
| Files anyone can reach | The Stranger | Crash |
| Web hygiene (headers, CORS, exposed files) | The Stranger | Scratch ×3 |
| Dummy A vs Dummy B | Both dummies | Totaled |
| Self-upgrades (is_pro, role) | Dummy B | Crash |
| Locked doors (admin pages) | Dummy B | Pass |
| Sign-up, sign-in and email limits | Dummy B | Dent ×2 |
| Critical flows, mobile and desktop | Both dummies | Pass |
Next steps
- Hand the fix plan to your agent, or paste the repair prompts one at a time.
- Your agent runs each finding's verify steps as it goes.
- Press Re-crash (included once, within 30 days). The same dummies run the same moves, and your Safety Rating updates.
This report describes the app on its test date, across the checks listed above. No test can guarantee an app is secure. Evidence is redacted, and deleted 30 days after delivery.